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Note
THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS HISTORY: NINTH CIRCUIT TAKES
ORIGINALIST APPROACH IN FINDING NO RIGHT TO
PUBLIC CARRY IN YOUNG V. HAWAII
SCOTT KINGSBURY*
“Does medieval and early modern English history really matter? In my
role as a federal appellate court judge, I can safely say that, for me, the
answer is yes, because our Supreme Court has said so.”1
I. SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE: 200 YEARS

OF

QUIESCENCE

The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”2 For more than 200 years following the adoption of the Second Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court did
not address any questions regarding the constitutionality of firearms regulations.3 Then, in the 2008 case of District of Columbia v. Heller,4 the U.S.
Supreme Court declared the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to bear arms.5 Today, any discussion of the Second Amendment
must begin with Heller.6
In Heller, the Supreme Court decided that the Second Amendment
guarantees an individual right to possess firearms for self-defense inside
the home.7 The Heller Court did not establish a clear test for lower courts
* J.D. Candidate, 2023, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.B.A., 2018, Temple University.
1. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Glorious Revolution to American Revolution: The English Origin of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 399
(2019). Judge Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit delivered this quote during a lecture as part of the University of
Notre Dame’s London Law at 50 Speaker Series. See id. at 397.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
3. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (“For most of
our history the question [of the constitutionality of firearms regulations] did not
present itself.”).
4. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
5. Id. at 635 (holding that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual
right to bear arms and that District of Columbia laws prohibiting handgun possession and keeping operable firearms in the home violated this right).
6. Jonathan E. Taylor, The Surprisingly Strong Originalist Case for Public Carry
Laws, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 347, 347 (2020) (remarking that a discussion of
public carry laws must start with a consideration of Heller).
7. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“[W]e hold that the District’s ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment . . . .”).

(759)
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to follow when considering firearm restrictions, stating the restriction at
issue in Heller would be unconstitutional under “any of the standards of
scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights.”8 However, the Court also said the right to bear arms protected by the Second
Amendment “is not unlimited.”9 Two years after Heller, the Supreme
Court decided the Second Amendment is applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.10
In response to gun violence, many states have implemented regulatory schemes that require individuals to show “proper cause” to carry firearms in public.11 Under these schemes, individuals must demonstrate a
“special need” to protect themselves to obtain a license to carry firearms in
public.12 Some judges and commentators believe proper cause laws restrict the Second Amendment rights of individuals unable to demonstrate
a special need to protect themselves.13 “[W]hether the Second Amendment guarantees individuals the right to carry arms openly in public” is,
not surprisingly, “a question that has divided the circuits.”14 The Ninth
Circuit correctly concluded that proper cause laws do not violate the Second Amendment in Young v. Hawaii;15 however, the Young court’s decision that these restrictions regulate conduct outside of the scope of the
Second Amendment is inconsistent with all other circuits that have addressed the issue and with the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller.16
8. See id. at 628–29 (“The prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where
the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute. Under any of the
standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights,
banning [firearms] from the home . . . would fail constitutional muster.” (citation
omitted)).
9. Id. at 626 (opining that the Second Amendment right is not “a right to
keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever
purpose . . . . [N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill
. . . .”).
10. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2010) (“[W]e hold
that the Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the States.”).
11. See Chelsea Tisoky, Comment, The Constitutionality of “Special Need” Laws, 5
U. PA. J.L. & PUB. AFF. 533, 535–36 (2020) (arguing “special need” public carry
laws should be subject to strict scrutiny, but that they are narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest, so they withstand strict scrutiny).
12. Id. at 535 (“[U]nder [proper cause regulatory schemes,] individuals may
not carry firearms in public unless they have a valid statutory reason.”). These
regulations are sometimes also referred to as “justifiable need,” “good cause,”
“good reason to fear injury,” and “good and substantial reason” laws. Id.
13. See, e.g., Young v. Hawaii, 992 F.3d 765, 784 (9th Cir. 2021) vacated 142 S.
Ct. 2895 (2022).
14. Id. (“[O]ur first task is to determine whether the right to carry a firearm
openly in public is protected by the Second Amendment.”).
15. 992 F.3d 765 (9th Cir. 2021), vacated 142 S. Ct. 2895 (2022).
16. See id. at 784 (“Each of these circuits . . . assumed that there was some
Second Amendment right to carry firearms in public and applied intermediate
scrutiny to the regulations at issue.”). The Young court, on the other hand, was
“persuaded that government regulations on open carry . . . ‘fall outside of the
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The Ninth Circuit, like most circuits, follows a two-step framework for
reviewing Second Amendment challenges.17 The court first asks whether
a challenged law burdens a right protected by the Second Amendment.18
If it does, the court then applies an appropriate level of means-end scrutiny (i.e., rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny) to the
challenged law.19 In Young, the Ninth Circuit became the first circuit to
decide that proper cause laws do not burden a right protected by the Second Amendment, upholding the law in step one and thus never reaching
the means-end analysis of step two.20
This Note analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s decision that proper cause laws
do not burden a right protected by the Second Amendment based on the
Anglo-American history of public carry laws. Ultimately, this Note argues
that, although the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded that proper cause
laws do not violate the Second Amendment, it should have decided the
issue based on means-end analysis—consistent with all other circuits that
have addressed the issue—rather than deciding the case based on history
and tradition.21 Part II summarizes the circuit split that developed over
the constitutionality of proper cause laws following the Supreme Court’s
decision in Heller. Part III provides the facts and procedural history of
Young. Part IV summarizes the Ninth Circuit’s canvas of more than 700
years of legal history and discusses the en banc court’s decision that this
history disproves any individual Second Amendment right to bear arms in
public for self-defense. Part V critiques the Ninth Circuit’s departure from
all other circuit courts in its use of history instead of means-end analysis to
decide the constitutionality of proper cause laws. Part VI discusses the
Second Amendment’s scope,’ and thus ‘may be upheld without further analysis.’ ”
Id. at 813 (quoting Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 821 (9th Cir. 2016)).
17. See Young, 992 F.3d at 783 (applying the two-step framework).
18. See id. (explaining that the Supreme Court has frequently relied on a historical understanding of the Second Amendment when determining whether a law
burdens a Second Amendment right).
19. See id. at 784 (describing the second step of the two-step framework).
20. See id. at 784–85, 823 (observing that, although other circuits assumed
proper cause laws restricted a Second Amendment right to avoid extensive historical analysis in favor of means-end analysis, “[w]e do not think we can avoid the
historical record”).
21. See Russell W. Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law,
21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 449, 450 (1988) (explaining that courts performing meansend analysis (or means-end scrutiny) look to determine whether an appropriate
relationship exists between a government action and the government interest it
purportedly seeks to further). To pass rational basis review, the least intense form
of means-end analysis, government actions require only some rational relationship
to a legitimate government interest, regardless of the availability of less restrictive
alternatives. See id. at 451. To pass strict scrutiny, the most intense form of meansend analysis, government actions must be narrowly tailored—i.e., the least restrictive means possible—to further a compelling government interest. See id. at 453.
Intermediate scrutiny, as the name suggests, is a standard between rational basis
and strict scrutiny; it requires that a government action be “substantially related to
an important government objective.” See Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 672 (1st
Cir. 2018) (quoting Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)).
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impact of Young and the Supreme Court’s similarly history-based decision
in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen.22
II. CIRCUITS SPLIT OVER HOW

TO

SCRUTINIZE PROPER CAUSE LAWS

The First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits upheld proper
cause licensing schemes against Second Amendment challenges, while the
Seventh and D.C. Circuits found that such schemes violate the Second
Amendment.23 However, all but the Ninth Circuit either found or assumed that there is a Second Amendment right to open carry.24 The
Ninth Circuit concluded that proper cause restrictions on the open carry
of firearms “reflect longstanding prohibitions and . . . the conduct they
regulate is therefore outside the historical scope of the Second
Amendment.”25
A.

Circuits Holding Proper Cause Laws Violate the Second Amendment

The Seventh and D.C. Circuits found proper cause laws violated the
Second Amendment by expanding the “core” of the Second Amendment
from what Heller defined as a right to possess firearms for self-defense inside the home to a right to possess firearms for self-defense in public.26 In
22. 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022).
23. See Young, 992 F.3d at 784 (observing these courts “avoided extensive historical analysis”).
24. See id. (stating that the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits assumed
there is a Second Amendment right to open carry, but that proper cause laws withstand intermediate scrutiny). A law withstands intermediate scrutiny if it is “substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental interest.”
Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012), abrogated by N.Y.
State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022). The Seventh and
D.C. Circuits found that there is a Second Amendment right to carry arms in public and that the proper cause laws at issue were total bans of that right, making
them unconstitutional regardless of any means-end analysis. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012), reh’g denied; Wrenn v. District of Columbia,
864 F.3d 650, 667 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
25. Young, 992 F.3d at 772, 783 (applying the two-step framework). Most circuits have adopted a two-step framework for reviewing Second Amendment challenges. Id. Under the two-step framework, courts first analyze whether the
challenged law affects conduct protected by the Second Amendment based on the
“historical understanding of the scope of the right.” Id. (quoting Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 821 (9th Cir. 2016)). If a court determines in the first step that
the challenged law does not burden conduct protected by the Second Amendment, then the law passes constitutional muster. Id. If the law does burden conduct protected by the Second Amendment, then the court proceeds to the second
step: determining an appropriate level of means-end scrutiny (e.g., rational basis,
intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny) and applying it to the challenged law. See
id. at 784. Because the Young court determined the Hawaii law did not burden
conduct protected by the Second Amendment based on the court’s historical analysis, it did not proceed to the second step and no level of means-end scrutiny was
necessary. See id. at 823.
26. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 942 (explaining that the extent of the Second
Amendment right to possess firearms for self-defense “has been opened to judicial
exploration by Heller and McDonald”); Wrenn 864 F.3d at 657 (reasoning that just
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Moore v. Madigan,27 the Seventh Circuit decided that an Illinois law
prohibiting individuals from carrying a gun “ready to use” in places other
than the individual’s own property, home, place of business, or on property whose owner has permitted individuals to be there with a ready-to-use
gun violated the Second Amendment.28 In that case, the Seventh Circuit
found the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller controlling.29 Like the Supreme Court in Heller, the Moore court’s analysis was “not based on degrees
of scrutiny.”30 The Moore court was “disinclined to engage in another
round of historical analysis to determine whether eighteenth-century
America understood the Second Amendment to include a right to bear
guns outside the home.”31 Instead, the court decided that self-defense is
“as important outside the home as inside,” and because the Supreme
Court decided the Second Amendment confers an individual right to bear
arms for self-defense in Heller, the Illinois law infringed upon the Second
Amendment.32 Moreover, and seemingly inconsistent with its own claim
that its decision was not based on degrees of scrutiny, the Moore court held
that:
Illinois had to provide us with more than merely a rational basis
for believing that its uniquely sweeping ban is justified by an increase in public safety. It has failed to meet this burden. The
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment
therefore compels us to reverse the [lower courts].33
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit decided that a D.C. regulatory scheme requiring individuals seeking a handgun license to show “‘good reason to
fear injury to [their] person or property’ or ‘any other proper reason for

because the Supreme Court in Heller focused on the need for self-defense in the
home does not mean the right is limited to the home).
27. 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012), reh’g denied, 708 F.3d 901.
28. Id. at 934, 942 (“The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Second
Amendment . . . compels us to reverse . . . and remand . . . for the entry of declarations of unconstitutionality and permanent injunctions.”).
29. See id. at 942 (finding that the Supreme Court’s decision that the Second
Amendment confers a right to bear arms for self-defense inside the home also
established a right to bear arms for self-defense outside the home because bearing
arms for self-defense “is as important outside the home as inside”).
30. Id. at 941 (“[O]ur analysis is not based on degrees of scrutiny, but on
Illinois’s failure to justify the most restrictive gun law of any of the 50 states.”).
31. Id. at 942 (deciding the Supreme Court’s analysis in Heller was sufficient to
establish that the history of the Second Amendment confers a right to bear arms
for self-defense outside the home).
32. Id. (“The theoretical and empirical evidence (which overall is inconclusive) is consistent with concluding that a right to carry firearms in public may promote self-defense.”).
33. Id. (conflicting with its earlier statement that the court would not engage
in degrees of scrutiny analysis).
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carrying a pistol’” violated the Second Amendment.34 The D.C. Circuit
held that “the [Second] Amendment’s core at a minimum shields the typically situated citizen’s ability to carry common arms generally,” and that
because D.C.’s good-reason law “is necessarily a total ban on exercises of
that constitutional right for most D.C. residents,” it violates the Second
Amendment based on Heller.35 The Second Amendment “must enable the
typical citizen to carry a gun,” which necessarily conflicts with good-reason
laws.36
B.

Circuits Holding Proper Cause Laws Do Not Violate the Second Amendment

The First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits have upheld proper
cause laws, eschewing historical analysis by presuming the laws burdened a
right protected by the Second Amendment in order to decide the cases
based on means-end analysis.37 The Second Circuit decided that a New
York law requiring individuals to show “proper cause” to obtain a handgun
license does not violate the Second Amendment.38 In Kachalsky v. County
of Westchester,39 the Second Circuit reasoned that “[b]ecause our tradition
so clearly indicates a substantial role for state regulation of the carrying of
firearms in public . . . intermediate scrutiny is appropriate.”40 Considering whether New York’s proper cause regulatory scheme withstood intermediate scrutiny, the Kachalsky court first determined the governmental
interests that the law sought to further were public safety and crime prevention, which all parties agreed were “substantial, indeed compelling,
governmental interests.”41 Next, the court decided the regulations on
handgun possession were substantially related to those interests.42 Thus,
34. Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 655 (alteration in original)
(quoting D.C. Code § 22-4506(a)-(b) (2001)) (“The Code also limits what the police chief may count as satisfying these two criteria . . . .”), reh’g denied.
35. Id. at 667 (holding that the right of responsible citizens to bear arms for
self-defense outside the home is a core Second Amendment right).
36. See id. at 668 (explaining that the court’s decision “does little more than
trace the boundaries laid in 1791 and flagged in Heller[ ],” and opining that goodreason laws “seem almost uniquely designed to defy” the Second Amendment right
of the typical citizen to carry a gun).
37. Young v. Hawaii, 992 F.3d 765, 784 (9th Cir. 2021) (observing that these
courts “avoided extensive historical analysis” by assuming proper cause laws burden a Second Amendment right and upholding them based on means-end analyses), vacated 142 S. Ct. 2895 (2022).
38. Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding
the proper cause requirement would survive intermediate scrutiny if it implicated
the Second Amendment), abrogated by N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen,
142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022).
39. 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012), abrogated by Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111.
40. Id. at 96 (explaining that a law withstands intermediate scrutiny if it is
“substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental interest”).
41. Id. at 97.
42. Id. at 98 (“Restricting handgun possession in public to those who have a
reason to possess the weapon for a lawful purpose is substantially related to New
York’s interests in public safety and crime prevention.”).
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the law withstood intermediate scrutiny.43 The Kachalsky court decided
New York’s proper cause law was constitutional by proceeding to the
means-end analysis step of the two-step framework.44 However, the court
briefly mentioned the history of the Second Amendment and firearm regulations in dicta and implied that proper cause laws fall outside the scope
of the Second Amendment, finding these laws “entirely consistent with the
right to bear arms.”45
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit decided that a Maryland law requiring
individuals to have “good and substantial reason” to carry a handgun in
public did not violate the Second Amendment.46 In Woollard v. Gallagher,47 the court assumed without deciding that the law implicated Second Amendment protections and applied intermediate scrutiny.48 The
law passed intermediate scrutiny because the Woollard court found that
“there is a reasonable fit between the good-and-substantial-reason requirement and Maryland’s objectives of protecting public safety and preventing
crime.”49
Further, the Third Circuit decided in Drake v. Filko50 that a New Jersey
law requiring “justifiable need” to carry a handgun in public did not violate the Second Amendment.51 Despite the court’s belief to the contrary,
it assumed New Jersey’s “justifiable need” requirement burdened conduct
43. Id. (reiterating that the law “need only be substantially related to the state’s
important public safety interest” and stating that “[a] perfect fit . . . is not
required”).
44. Id. at 98–99.
45. Id. at 100 (“In light of the state’s considerable authority—enshrined
within the Second Amendment—to regulate firearm possession in public, requiring a showing that there is an objective threat to a person’s safety—a ‘special need
for self-protection’—before granting a carry license is entirely consistent with the
right to bear arms.” (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney 2022), invalidated by N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022))).
46. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 868 (4th Cir. 2013) (disagreeing with
the district court’s “trailblazing pronouncement that the Second Amendment
right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense extends outside the
home,” and reversing the district court’s holding that Maryland’s “good-and-substantial-reason requirement cannot pass constitutional muster”), abrogated by Bruen,
142 S. Ct. 2111. The court reached its decision without “needlessly demarcating
the reach of the Second Amendment.” Id.
47. 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013), abrogated by Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111.
48. Id. at 876 (“We hew to a judicious course today, refraining from any assessment of whether Maryland’s good-and-substantial-reason requirement for obtaining a handgun permit implicates Second Amendment protections. That is, we
merely assume that the Heller right exists outside the home and that such right of
Appellee Woollard has been infringed.”).
49. Id. at 880–81 (“We specifically subscribe to the Kachalsky court’s analysis
that New York’s proper-cause requirement ‘is oriented to the Second Amendment’s protections,’ and constitutes ‘a more moderate approach’ to protecting
public safety and preventing crime than a wholesale ban on the public carrying of
handguns.” (quoting Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 98–99)).
50. 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013), abrogated by Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111.
51. Id. at 440 (upholding proper cause firearm law).
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within the scope of the Second Amendment in order to avoid historical
analysis and to decide the case based instead on means-end analysis.52 Deciding that any supposed Second Amendment right to carry a handgun
outside the home for self-defense, if it exists at all, is “not part of the core
of the [Second] Amendment,” the Drake court determined intermediate
scrutiny was the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply.53 Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court found that requiring applicants to demonstrate a “justifiable need” was a reasonable fit with the state’s substantial
interest in protecting its citizens’ safety.54 The Drake court also cited the
Second Circuit’s decision in Kachalsky and the Third Circuit’s decision in
Woollard for support.55 The court also noted that New Jersey’s justifiable
need law was in some ways more restrictive than similar laws in other
states, but it concluded that New Jersey’s law nonetheless withstood intermediate scrutiny as the intermediate scrutiny standard of review does not
require the law to be the least restrictive means for achieving the government’s objective.56
Finally, in Gould v. Morgan,57 the First Circuit upheld a Massachusetts
firearm licensing scheme that required handgun-license applicants to
demonstrate a “proper purpose” for carrying a gun.58 The statute left
room for municipalities to decide what amounts to proper purpose.59
Boston and Brookline required applicants to show a specific need for selfdefense beyond a “generalized desire to be safe.”60 According to the First
Circuit, this proper purpose scheme did not violate the Second Amendment.61 The Gould court, like virtually all courts addressing Second
52. Id. at 434 (“[W]e believe that the ‘justifiable need’ . . . Handgun Permit
Law . . . regulates conduct falling outside the scope of the Second Amendment’s
guarantee.”). Nevertheless, the Drake court moved on to the second step of the
two-step framework and applied means-end scrutiny because “the constitutional
issues presented to us in this new era of Second Amendment jurisprudence are of
critical importance.” Id. at 434–35.
53. Id. at 436 (rejecting plaintiffs’ suggestion to apply strict scrutiny).
54. Id. at 437–38 (finding New Jersey “undoubtedly” had a substantial interest
and that the only real issue was whether there was a reasonable fit between the
interest and the means chosen to achieve it).
55. Id. at 438 (“Legislators in other states, including New York [Kachalsky] and
Maryland [Woollard], have reached this same predictive judgment and have enacted similar laws as a means to improve public safety.”).
56. Id. at 439–40 (concluding the justifiable need standard “withstands intermediate scrutiny and is therefore constitutional”).
57. 907 F.3d 659 (1st Cir. 2018), abrogated by N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n,
Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022).
58. Id. at 663 (explaining Massachusetts’ firearms licensing scheme).
59. See id. (“Municipalities differ in their requirements for an applicant to
establish eligibility based on the [statute].”).
60. Id. (noting that this requirement—to show a specific need beyond a general need for self-defense—was “the focal point of the plaintiffs’ challenge”).
61. Id. at 662 (holding the regulations do not violate the Second Amendment
as they are substantially related to important government interests in promoting
public safety and crime prevention).
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Amendment challenges, adopted the two-step approach for analyzing Boston and Brookline’s regulatory schemes.62 In step one, the Gould court
assumed the Boston and Brookline regulations burdened the Second
Amendment.63 In step two, the court decided intermediate scrutiny was
appropriate and that the regulations withstood intermediate scrutiny.64
III. APPLICATION DENIED: YOUNG LACKED SUFFICIENT NEED
FOR HANDGUN
In 2007, Hawaii’s legislature enacted Hawaii Revised Statutes section
134-9 (2007), regulating licenses to carry firearms. The licensing scheme’s
restrictions on licenses to carry handguns—requiring applicants to
demonstrate they are an “exceptional case” and have “reason to fear injury”—trace back to a seminal 1933 Hawaii firearms regulation act.65 In
fact, Hawaii’s laws limited public carry of weapons long before it was a
state.66
Under section 134-9, individuals seeking a license to carry a handgun
in public must apply to their county’s chief of police and demonstrate they
are an “exceptional case” and have “reason to fear injury to [their] person
or property.”67 The statute requires the chief of police of each county in
62. Id. at 668 (“In the decade since Heller was decided, courts have adopted a
two-step approach for analyzing claims that a statute, ordinance, or regulation infringes the Second Amendment right.”). Under the two-step framework, courts
first determine whether the challenged law “burdens conduct that falls within the
scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.” Id. at 668–69. To do so, the court
considers history and tradition to see if the regulated conduct “was understood to
be within the scope of the right at the time of ratification.” Id. at 669 (quoting
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010)). If the law does not
burden conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment, it is constitutional,
and no further analysis is required. Id. If the law does burden conduct within the
scope of the Second Amendment, courts apply an appropriate level of means-end
scrutiny. Id.
63. Id. at 670 (“[H]istorical inquiry does not dictate an answer to the question
of whether the Boston and Brookline policies burden conduct falling within the
scope of the Second Amendment. . . . In the absence of such guidance, we . . .
proceed on the assumption that the . . . policies burden the Second Amendment
. . . .”).
64. Id. at 670–77. The court remarked that the Boston and Brookline policies
“fit seamlessly” with Massachusetts’ objective of reducing gun violence on public
streets. Id. at 676.
65. See Young v. Hawaii, 992 F.3d 765, 774–75 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that
Hawaii’s current licensing scheme is substantially the same as it was under regulations enacted in 1961, which “mirrored” regulations from the 1933 act), vacated
142 S. Ct. 2895 (2022). “The ‘exceptional case’ and ‘good reason to fear injury’
requirements included in the 1933 [a]ct became staples of Hawai‘i’s future firearm
regulations.” Id. (quoting Act 26, § 8, 1933–1934 Haw. Sess. Laws Spec. Sess. 35,
39).
66. Id. at 773 (“Hawai‘i law began limiting public carriage of dangerous weapons, including firearms, more than 150 years ago—nearly fifty years before it became a U.S. territory and more than a century before it became a state.”).
67. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9(a) (2007) (“In an exceptional case, when an
applicant shows reason to fear injury to the applicant’s person or property, the
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the state to adopt procedures for evaluating license applications.68 The
County of Hawaii adopted county-wide rules for evaluating permit applications under section 134-9, which were more restrictive than the state law.69
However, the county regulations are only valid to the extent they are authorized by the state law; where Hawaii County’s rules exceed section 1349, “the statute—not the county’s regulation—would control.”70 According to a formal opinion from Hawaii’s Attorney General interpreting section 134-9, “[a]ll that the statute requires is that the applicant (1) meet the
objective qualifications; (2) be of good moral character; (3) demonstrate
‘sufficient need’; and (4) present no other reason to be disqualified.”71
To demonstrate “sufficient need,” “an applicant must demonstrate more
than a ‘generalized concern for safety.’”72
In 2011, the plaintiff, George Young, applied for licenses to carry a
firearm in public, either concealed or unconcealed, citing a general need
for “personal security, self-preservation and defense, and protection of
personal family members and property.”73 The Hawaii County police
chief denied both applications because the police chief determined Young
had not shown an “exceptional case[ ] or demonstrated urgency.”74
Young challenged the licensing decision and Hawaii’s licensing laws
through several claims, including a Second Amendment challenge.75 The
chief of police of the appropriate county may grant a license . . . to carry a pistol or
revolver . . . . Where the urgency or the need has been sufficiently indicated, the
respective chief of police may grant to an applicant of good moral character . . . a
license to carry a pistol or revolver . . . unconcealed . . . .”); Young, 992 F.3d at 775
(“Hawai‘i continues to distinguish between concealed carry and open carry, although it is not clear that the difference is particularly significant.”).
68. HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9(b) (2007) (requiring the chief of police of each
county to adopt procedures for evaluating licenses to carry concealed weapons).
69. Young, 992 F.3d at 776 (observing that the Hawaii County regulations are
more demanding than § 134-9 and apply to a broader class of weapons).
70. See id. at 776–77 (citing Ruggles v. Yagong, 353 P.3d 953, 964 (Haw.
2015)) (explaining that Hawaii law only authorizes county ordinances consistent
with state law).
71. Id. at 776 (quoting State of Haw., Dep’t of the Att’y Gen., Opinion Letter
No. 18-1: Availability of Unconcealed-Carry Licenses, at 6–7 (Sept. 11, 2018) [hereinafter Opinion Letter No. 18-1]) (describing the Attorney General’s letter, which
discussed how aspects of the County of Hawaii’s local rules were not authorized by
state law).
72. Id. at 776–77 (quoting Opinion Letter No. 18-1, supra note 71, at 8) (defining “sufficient need”). Applicants must show a need to carry a firearm for selfdefense “that substantially exceeds the need possessed by ordinary law-abiding citizens.” Id. at 777 (quoting Opinion Letter No. 18-1 supra note 71, at 7).
73. Id. at 777 (noting the applications for concealed and unconcealed licenses were separate).
74. Id. (alteration in original) (stating Hawaii County police chief denied
both applications).
75. Id. (“[Young] brought separate counts under the Bill of Attainder Clause,
the Contracts Clause, the Second Amendment, the Ninth Amendment, and the
Privileges or Immunities and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
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district court dismissed all claims.76 Regarding the Second Amendment
claim, the district court decided the Hawaii law did not burden Second
Amendment rights and that, even if it did, it would withstand intermediate
scrutiny.77 Young appealed and a Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district
court decision.78 The Ninth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc to consider whether the Hawaii law violated the Second Amendment.79
IV. FROM LANCE

TO

BLUNDERBUSS: YE OLDE SECOND AMENDMENT

This Part summarizes the Ninth Circuit’s historical analysis of the Second Amendment in Young. The court limited its scope of review to a facial
challenge of section 134-9 because Young did not brief an as-applied challenge.80 The Young court employed the two-step framework.81 By deciding the case in the first step, the Young court diverged from all other
circuits that have addressed this issue.82 While other circuits have all assumed or decided—without extensive historical analysis—that the Second
Amendment protects an individual’s right to carry firearms openly in public, the Young court conducted an extensive historical analysis without
making any assumptions.83
A.

The English Right to Bear Arms

The Young court began by analyzing the English concept of the right
to bear arms.84 The English restricted the right to carry weapons in public
76. Id. at 777–78 (“Although the district court dismissed Young’s claims on
various grounds, the only grounds relevant here relate to his Second Amendment
and Due Process claims; his other claims have been abandoned on appeal.”).
77. Id. at 778 (employing the two-step framework, the district court determined the licensing scheme “did not implicate conduct that is protected by the
Second Amendment,” and, alternatively, that the scheme withstood intermediate
scrutiny).
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing Young v. Hawaii, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019)) (granting rehearing en banc).
80. Id. at 780–81 (“Young challenges HRS § 134-9 exclusively on its face, arguing, for example, that HRS § 134-9’s ‘exceptional case’ requirement renders the
statute unconstitutional, [and] that HRS § 134-9 violates the broad right to carry
firearms in public . . . .”).
81. Id. at 783 (“Following Heller and McDonald, we have created a two-step
framework to review Second Amendment challenges. Our two-step test is similar
to tests adopted by other circuits.”).
82. See supra note 24 (discussing the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits’
approaches to the Second Amendment two-step analysis).
83. See id. at 784–85 (“Our sister circuits have, in large part, avoided extensive
historical analysis . . . . We do not think we can avoid the historical record.”); see
also id. at 786–821 (dedicating thirty-five pages of the opinion to a survey of the
history of firearm regulations).
84. Id. at 786 (“[A]s Heller made clear, the Second Amendment did not create
a new right; it codified a pre-existing one that we ‘inherited from our English
ancestors.’ ” (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008))).
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as early as the thirteenth century.85 In many cases, people were required
to obtain the “king’s special license” to be armed in public, which the
government enforced by punishment.86 The Statute of Northampton, enacted in 1328, codified these restrictions and prohibited people from “going armed in places people were likely to gather.”87 It is unclear how
strictly the English government enforced the Statute of Northampton because there is evidence of only a few indictments under the statute.88 The
Young court also highlighted two early English cases involving arms restrictions: Chune v. Piott89 and Sir John Knight’s Case.90 In Chune, the court decided that “[t]he sheriff could arrest a person carrying arms in public
‘notwithstanding he doth not break the peace.’”91 In Sir John Knight’s
Case, Sir John Knight was charged under the Statute of Northampton for,
according to one report, “goeing with a blunderbus in the streets, to the
terrifyeing his majesties subjects.”92 He was acquitted, but the Young court
found it important as an example of one of the few indictments under the
Statute of Northampton.93
The Young court next highlighted English treatises that recognized
prohibitions on publicly carrying arms in England.94 According to one of
England’s first treatises, “no one, of whatever condition he be, [may] go
armed in the said city or in the suburbs, or carry arms, by day or by
85. Id. at 786 (“In 1299, Edward I ordered the sheriffs of Salop and Stafford to
prohibit any one ‘from tourneying, tilting . . . or jousting, or making assemblies, or
otherwise going armed within the realm without the king’s special licen[s]e.’ ” (alterations in
original) (quoting CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, EDWARD I: VOLUME 4,
1296–1302, at 318 (H.C. Maxwell Lyte ed. 1906) [hereinafter CALENDAR OF THE
CLOSE ROLLS])).
86. Id. at 786–87 (quoting CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, supra note 85, at
588) (explaining regulations on public carry in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries).
87. Id. at 787–88 (citing Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, ch. 3 (England
1328)). The court noted that,“[a]ny doubt as to the scope of government’s authority to disarm the people in public was dispelled with Parliament’s 1328 enactment of the Statute of Northampton, which effectively codified the firearms
restrictions that preceded it.” Id. at 787.
88. See id. at 789 (noting that despite the scant record of indictments, “there is
evidence that Edward III and his successors regularly instructed sheriffs to enforce
the statute”).
89. (1615) 80 Eng. Rep. 1161 (K.B.).
90. (1686) 87 Eng. Rep. 75–76 (K.B.); Young, 992 F.3d at 790 (“We have been
pointed to two cases that may shed light on the restrictions in the Statute of
Northampton.”).
91. Young, 992 F.3d at 790 (quoting Chune v. Piott (1615) 80 Eng. Rep. 1161
(K.B.)).
92. Id. (quoting NARCISSUS LUTTRELL, A BRIEF HISTORICAL RELATION OF STATE
AFFAIRS, SEPTEMBER 1678 TO APRIL 1714, at 380 (1857)).
93. See id. (“The second [case] is Sir John Knight’s Case, which is important
because it was one of the few prosecutions under the Statute of Northampton for
which we have some record, even if there are some disputes about what that record
signifies.”).
94. See id. at 792 (turning from early English cases to treatises).
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night.”95 Some treatises argued that publicly carrying arms was only an
offense if it caused or was intended to cause terror.96 Others, including
treatises by Sir William Blackstone and Lord Edward Coke, “strongly suggested that carrying arms openly was a status offense and that the law did
not require proof of intent or effect.”97
Finally, before crossing the pond to a discussion of colonial America,
the Young court discussed the English Bill of Rights.98 The English Bill of
Rights provided “[t]hat the [s]ubjects which are Protestants may have
[a]rms for their [d]efence suitable to their [c]onditions and as allowed by
[l]aw.”99 According to the Young court, this provision was important because it connected the right to bear arms to self-defense while recognizing
the government’s ability to limit that right; also, it gave the right only to
Protestants.100 Blackstone, discussing the English Bill of Rights, observed
that “these rights and liberties [are] our birthright to enjoy . . . unless
where the laws of our country have laid them under necessary
restraints.”101
B.

Colonial Restrictions on the Right to Bear Arms in Public

Some colonies imported English arms regulations like those in the
Statute of Northampton based on concerns that the presence of firearms
“in the public square” was dangerous.102 Though some colonies placed
restrictions on public carry, others “not only permitted public carry, but
mandated it.”103 The Young court downplayed these permissive colonies
and the various carry mandates, saying their overall effect on the right to
95. Id. (quoting JOHN CARPENTER, LIBER ALBUS: THE WHITE BOOK OF THE CITY
LONDON 335 (Henry Thomas Riley ed., 1862)).
96. See id. (discussing whether carrying arms in public violated the Statute of
Northampton if it did not cause terror). According to one treatise author, a seventeenth century barrister and jurist, “no wearing of arms is within the meaning of
this statute [of Northampton], unless it be accompanied with such circumstances
as are apt to terrify the people.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 1 WILLIAM
HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 489 (John Curwood ed., 1824)).
97. Id. at 792–93 (citing treatises that suggested a violation of the Statute of
Northampton did not require proof of public terror as a separate element).
98. Id. at 793–94 (discussing how the English right to bear arms changed after
the Glorious Revolution with the enactment of the English Bill of Rights in 1689).
99. Id. at 793 (alterations in original) (quoting 1 W. & M. ch. 2, § 7, (1689)).
100. See id. (discussing the significance of the right to bear arms in the English Bill of Rights).
101. Id. at 794 (alterations in original) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *131).
102. Id. (“A number of colonies implemented restrictions on the carrying of
arms similar to those found in the Statute of Northampton . . . . The colonists
shared the English concern that the mere presence of firearms in the public
square presented a danger to the community.”).
103. Id. at 795 (noting public carry mandates in Virginia, Connecticut, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island).
OF
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bear arms is “unclear.”104 Under the Young court’s interpretation, mandating the public carrying of arms is a form of regulation the same as
prohibiting the public carrying of arms.105 Thus, any colonial-era history
demonstrating an acceptance of public carry can be sidestepped because it
“was always subject to conditions prescribed by the legislature.”106 The
history thus framed “strongly suggests that colonists brought with them the
English acquiescence to firearm limitations outlined in the Statute of
Northampton.”107
C.

Post Second Amendment Restrictions on the Right to Bear Arms

Following ratification of the Constitution, states continued to restrict
the public carrying of arms.108 The legislatures of states with constitutional provisions protecting the right to bear arms apparently did not find
prohibitions on publicly carrying firearms inconsistent with their constitutions.109 Many state laws were similar to the English Statute of Northampton, and North Carolina virtually adopted the Statute of Northampton,
not even removing references to the king.110 The law provided that “no
man . . . go nor ride armed by night nor by day.”111 Hawaii’s nineteenthcentury firearm restrictions mirrored many of these state laws, punishing
“[a]ny person not authorized by law, who shall carry, or be found armed
with, any bowie-knife, swordcane, pistol, air-gun, slung-shot or other
deadly weapon.”112
104. Id. at 796 (discussing the import of colonial laws permitting or requiring
public carry of arms).
105. Id. (“The overall effect that these various carry mandates had on the
right to bear arms is unclear, and there is some tension between the various ordinances. What is clear is that the colonies assumed that they had the power to
regulate—whether through mandates or prohibitions—the public carrying of arms.”).
106. Id. (dismissing arguments that this history demonstrates a right to carry
arms in public because even where colonies allowed public carry it was always theoretically subject to restrictions at the legislature’s will). For a further critical analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s rationale, see Part V.
107. Id. (“[W]here the colonies did allow public carry—or even mandated
it—those laws were tied to the overarching duty to bear arms in defense of the
community . . . . At bottom, restrictions on firearms in public were prevalent in
colonial law.”).
108. Id. at 797 (explaining that when the Bill of Rights was adopted it did not
apply to the states, so most of the early cases involve “state constitutional analogues
to the Second Amendment”).
109. Id. at 801–02 (“[S]tates broadly agreed that small, concealable weapons,
including firearms, could be banned from the public square. . . . [S]tate legislatures evidently did not believe that the restrictions we have discussed here were
inconsistent with their state constitutions.”).
110. Id. at 798 (discussing post-ratification firearm restrictions in the states).
111. Id. (quoting 1792 N.C. Laws 60, ch. 3) (describing restrictive state firearm laws). A Massachusetts law punished those who “shall ride or go armed offensively.” Id. (quoting 1795 Mass. Acts 436, ch. 2).
112. Id. at 802 (quoting 1852 Haw. Sess. Laws 19, § 1).
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In the early nineteenth century, states began adopting new restrictions on mere firearm possession regardless of any public disturbance.113
Significantly, a Massachusetts law limited the public carry of pistols to
those who had “reasonable cause” to fear an assault or violence.114 Many
states adopted laws similar to Massachusetts’s, some copying the Massachusetts statute word-for-word, others making adjustments and exceptions.115
The Ninth Circuit summarized the state laws from this period, noting that
generally the states agreed that small, concealable firearms could be
banned from “the public square,” and that, despite state constitutional
provisions guaranteeing a right to bear arms, state legislatures adopted
restrictions on the public carry of firearms.116 When Hawaii was a U.S.
territory, its laws were similar to these early state laws restricting firearm
possession.117
D.

The Basic Rule

After reviewing over 700 years of English and American history, the
Young court concluded that the history of this issue is not uniform.118
However messy and conflicted the Young court found that the “history
reveals a strong theme: [the] government has the power to regulate arms
in the public square.”119 Following its historical inquiry, the court found
that individuals do not have the “general right” to carry arms in public for
self-defense.120 Accordingly, the court held: “There is no right to carry
arms openly in public; nor is any such right within the scope of the Second
Amendment.”121 Because Young’s challenge failed at step one of the twostep framework—the challenged law did not infringe upon a right within
the scope of the Second Amendment—the means-end analysis was not
113. Id. at 799 (discussing how these new restrictions began with Tennessee
and Massachusetts). Tennessee prohibited any carrying of belt or pocket pistols.
Id.
114. Id. (quoting 1836 Mass. Acts 750, ch. 134, § 16) (“In effect, the Massachusetts law provided that such weapons could not be carried in public unless the
person so armed could show ‘reasonable cause.’ ” (quoting 1836 Mass. Acts 750,
ch. 134, § 16)).
115. Id. (discussing laws from Wisconsin, Virginia, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Texas, Arizona, and Idaho).
116. Id. at 801–02 (summarizing the court’s analysis of historical firearm
laws).
117. Id. at 802 (“The Territory of Hawai‘i’s enumerated restrictions on carrying weapons were well within this tradition.”).
118. Id. at 813 (synthesizing a basic rule from 700 years of English and American legal history).
119. Id. (“[T]he overwhelming evidence from the states’ constitutions and
statutes, the cases, and the commentaries confirms that we have never assumed
that individuals have an unfettered right to carry weapons in public spaces.”).
120. Id. (summarizing its review of the history of public carry laws).
121. Id. at 821 (citing Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 96 (2d
Cir. 2012), abrogated by N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111
(2022)).
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necessary and the court concluded that the law did not violate the Second
Amendment.122
V.

SCHRÖDINGER’S HISTORY OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: RIGHTS BOTH
REAL AND ILLUSORY UNTIL OBSERVED

This Part provides a critical analysis of the Young court’s use of history
and tradition to decide Second Amendment cases before applying meansend analysis. Subsection A explains how the ambiguous history of the Second Amendment rarely provides a clear answer to questions about the
scope of the Amendment’s protections. Subsection B explains how this
ambiguity invites judicial policymaking and makes it difficult for judges to
decide post-Heller Second Amendment cases based on objective criteria.
Finally, subsection C argues that to resolve these issues, courts should decide Second Amendment cases by performing means-end analysis as the
first step of the two-step framework, proceeding to historical analysis only
if the challenged law fails under the appropriate level of scrutiny.
A.

The History of the Second Amendment Is Ambiguous

The Ninth Circuit’s decision that the Second Amendment does not
create an individual right to bear arms outside the home for self-defense,
and that, therefore, it is not necessary to apply means-end scrutiny to uphold proper cause laws, is meaningfully inconsistent with all other circuits
that have addressed this issue.123 The dissent in Young emphasized this
point: “This holding is as unprecedented as it is extreme . . . . [W]e now
become the first and only court of appeals to hold that public carry falls
entirely outside the scope of the Amendment’s protections.”124 The history
and tradition of the Second Amendment cannot provide clear guidance
on the issue of proper cause laws if four dissenting judges considering that
history could conclude that it strongly suggests the Second Amendment
122. Id. at 826 (“Young’s challenge to Hawai‘i’s restrictions fails at step one of
our framework and ‘may be upheld without further analysis.’ ” (quoting Silvester v.
Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 821 (9th Cir. 2016)).
123. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96 (applying intermediate scrutiny based on
historical analysis, though without expressly employing the two-step framework);
Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013) (employing the “two-part”
approach, assuming that the good-and-substantial-reason requirement burdens a
Second Amendment right, and applying intermediate scrutiny), abrogated by N.Y.
State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022); Drake v. Filko, 724
F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2013) (employing the two-step framework, assuming that
requiring a “justifiable need” to carry a handgun for self-defense burdens a right
protected by the Second Amendment, and applying intermediate scrutiny), abrogated by Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111; Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 670, 672 (1st Cir.
2018) (employing the two-step approach, “proceed[ing] on the assumption that
the . . . policies burden the Second Amendment,” and applying intermediate scrutiny), abrogated by Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111.
124. Young, 992 F.3d at 829 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (finding the majority’s decision contradicts Anglo-American legal history).
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creates a general right to carry firearms openly in public—the exact opposite of the history-and-tradition-based conclusion of the majority.125
This ambiguity makes it difficult or impossible to resolve most Second
Amendment cases based solely on the Amendment’s history and tradition
and is why the two-step framework is necessary.126 Although the Supreme
Court’s decision in Heller appears to require some consideration of the
Second Amendment’s history and tradition, it offers little guidance on
how to proceed when that history is unclear with respect to a challenged
law.127 If anything, this means that history is binding only when it provides a reasonably definitive answer, and judges should not “read more
into the sources than they contain.”128 While history sometimes provides
reasonably clear answers to foundational questions—such as the question
presented in Heller of whether the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms or only a collective right to maintain a militia—it
is often insufficient in the “vast majority” of cases, making means-end analysis necessary.129
Further, because most modern Second Amendment cases involve
nuanced issues, “[t]here is virtually no relevant constitutional history bearing directly on most of these questions.”130 The crux of this issue, which is
perhaps why all other circuits have assumed proper cause laws infringe
some Second Amendment right in order to get to means-end analysis, is
that “[p]retending to find the answers in history and tradition will encourage either covert judicial policymaking . . . or ill-supported historical
stories in defense of results that could honestly and responsibly be justified
through normal means-end scrutiny.”131 So, ironically, reliance on history
and tradition invites exactly the kind of extra-judicial conduct it is meant
to prevent.132
The tension created by judges attempting to bootstrap inconsistent
history to clear definitions of constitutional rights is apparent in Young,
where the majority admitted to inconsistencies in the history and tradition
125. See id. at 832 (“[T]he history of the Second Amendment confirms what
the text so strongly suggests: that the Amendment encompasses a general right to
carry firearms openly in public.”).
126. See Nelson Lund, The Proper Role of History and Tradition in Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 30 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 174 (2020) (arguing judges
should consider the history of the Second Amendment as one factor in a meansend analysis).
127. Id. at 188–89, 195 (explaining the importance of the meaning of the
Second Amendment to those who enacted it following Heller).
128. Id. at 189 (describing the Seventh Circuit’s analytical framework for Second Amendment issues).
129. Id. at 195 (discussing when textual and historical analysis are sufficient to
resolve Second Amendment issues).
130. Id. at 195–96 (explaining that most cases will involve “questions about
the manner in which government may restrict the freedom to keep or bear arms in
the interest of promoting public safety”).
131. See id. at 196.
132. See id.
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of firearm regulations that cut against its conclusion.133 Both the majority
and dissenting opinions in Young agree that the history and tradition of
the Second Amendment is consistent (inconsistencies aside).134 They disagree only on what it is consistent about—what one side presents as evidence of a consistent historical understanding, the other side dismisses as
mere picayune inconsistencies.135
The D.C. Circuit, after considering the history and tradition of the
Second Amendment, decided that the right of responsible citizens to carry
firearms in public is a core right of the Amendment.136 In their briefs, the
parties and amici curiae in Moore “treated [the Seventh Circuit] to hundreds of pages of argument” focused on the history of the Second Amendment.137 Although the Moore court was “disinclined” to conduct extensive
historical analysis of the Second Amendment, in one part of its analysis it
cited to the same seventeenth century English cases that the Ninth Circuit
cited in Young.138 The Moore court used the case to support a Second
Amendment right to public carry, while the Ninth Circuit used the same
case to show a lack of support for a right to public carry.139
133. Young v. Hawaii, 992 F.3d 765, 821 (9th Cir. 2021) (“We have recognized
that the materials do not always agree . . . .”), vacated 142 S. Ct. 2895 (2022).
134. Compare id. at 820–21(finding the history of the Second Amendment does
not support a right to carry a firearm outside the home for self-defense, despite
certain longstanding exceptions), with id. at 831–32 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting)
(finding the history of the Second Amendment does support a right to carry a firearm outside the home for self-defense, despite some historical public carry firearms regulations).
135. See id. at 831 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (“Under appropriate inspection, the critical sources on the meaning of the Second Amendment—its text, its
historical interpretations . . . and its treatment by early legislatures—unequivocally
demonstrate that the Amendment does indeed protect the right to carry a gun
outside the home for self-defense . . . .”).
136. See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 667 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(finding that the right of “responsible citizens to carry firearms for personal selfdefense beyond the home” lies at the core of the Second Amendment and that
D.C.’s good-reason law was “necessarily a total ban on exercises of that constitutional right for most D.C. residents”).
137. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2012) (observing that
both sides of the case stacked the history of the Second Amendment to support its
argument for or against the Illinois law restricting public carry), reh’g denied, 708
F.3d 901.
138. Id. at 936, 942.
139. Compare id. at 936 (explaining that Sir John Knight’s Case interpreted the
Statute of Northampton as punishing “people who go armed to terrify the King’s
subjects,” emphasizing that some weapons do not terrify the public, so the statute
must only have applied to the public carry of some types of weapons), with Young,
992 F.3d at 790–91 (observing that, in Sir John Knight’s Case, the Chief Justice of the
King’s Bench opined that the Statute of Northampton was “to punish those who go
armed,” and that publicly carrying arms was “an affront to the king’s peace because the act of carrying arms in public suggested that ‘the King [was] not able or
willing to protect his subjects’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Sir John Knight’s
Case, 87 Eng. Rep. 75, 330 (K.B.))).
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How Judges May Use Ambiguity to Affect Policy

These inconsistent conclusions, ostensibly based on history, support
the notion that varying approaches to historical analysis can drastically affect the outcome of cases and allow judges to make policy decisions while
appearing to apply objective criteria.140 For instance, courts need to determine how long a law must have existed to be considered “longstanding.”141 In many cases, a law’s status as longstanding determines whether
a challenged regulation is consistent with the Second Amendment.142
The Heller Court decided that a law does not necessarily have to antedate
ratification of the Second Amendment to be considered longstanding, but
otherwise left the question open.143
Circuit courts and judges have split over the issue of the requisite time
for a law to be longstanding.144 Many modern firearm regulations are
rooted in laws enacted at the beginning of the twentieth century—a period of rapid growth in the administrative state and a time when firearm
technology was developing to a point where “it made sense to regulate
different kinds of firearms.”145 Perhaps unsurprisingly, it is this roughly
thirty-year period in the beginning of the twentieth century that divides
the courts, with upholding courts saying these laws should be considered,
and invalidating courts saying these laws are too recent to be considered.146 Additionally, judges conducting a historical analysis must attempt
140. See Mark Anthony Frassetto, Judging History: How Judicial Discretion in Applying Originalist Methodology Affects the Outcome of Post-Heller Second Amendment
Cases, 29 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 413, 413 (2020) (“[H]ow courts have addressed
what historical period to look to, how prevalent a historical tradition must be, and
whether to address history at a high or low level of generality—can drastically affect the outcome of cases.”).
141. Id. at 427 (describing step one of the two-step framework courts have
adopted for resolving Second Amendment challenges). Whether a law is “longstanding” is significant because the Supreme Court in Heller said:
“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,
or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
626–27 (2008)).
142. Id. (explaining that the measure of “longstanding” is often determinative
as to whether a gun regulation violates the Second Amendment).
143. Id. at 428 (pointing to the Heller Court’s consideration of
“[p]ostenactment legislative history” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 605)).
144. Id. (“While often not explicit about the answer, courts have generally
split across two conclusions: setting the cutoff at either the tail end of the nineteenth century or the first third of the twentieth century.”).
145. Id. at 427–28 (summarizing the development of firearms regulations
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century).
146. See id. at 428–31 (summarizing the different circuit court decisions on
what amounts to “longstanding”).
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to reconcile regional inconsistencies and decide how prevalent a regulatory tradition must have been to affect its analysis.147
Deciding Second Amendment challenges based on the Amendment’s
historical understanding invites judicial lawmaking and creates precedent
that is difficult to apply in future cases.148 Analyzing the historical understanding of the Second Amendment to decide Second Amendment challenges will often turn on what sources are considered and at what level of
generality the survey is conducted, rather than any objective evidence.149
In this context, “judicial policymaking is especially invidious because it is
hidden behind the veneer of neutral methodological decisions.”150
Nowhere is judicial policymaking more invidious or better “hidden
behind the veneer of neutral methodological decisions” than in Second
Amendment cases “where the body of historical regulation, case law, and
scholarly and popular commentary is so large and spread over such a
broad period of time that radically different conclusions can be reached
based on barely visible changes in methodology.”151 The irony of this proposition is that the originalist framework rooted in textual and historical
analysis is meant to guard against such judicial overreach.152 In Justice
Scalia’s McDonald concurrence, he defended originalist methodology by
saying it is “beyond all serious dispute that [originalist methodology] is
much less subjective . . . because it depends upon a body of evidence susceptible of reasoned analysis rather than a variety of vague ethico-political
First Principles whose combined conclusion can be found to point in any
direction the judges favor.”153
C.

A Simple Solution Already Adopted by Many Circuits

Courts should “hew to a judicious course” by assuming in marginal
cases that challenged laws burden conduct protected by the Second
Amendment as historically understood and proceed to apply means-end
147. Id. at 431–36 (discussing issues of prevalence and regional variation).
148. See Lund, supra note 126, at 196 (arguing that decisions based on historical analysis invite judicial policymaking).
149. See Frassetto, supra note 140, at 452–53 (arguing that deciding Second
Amendment cases based solely on history and tradition, “even if the history is examined in an evenhanded manner, retains enormous opportunity for a judge’s
‘ethico-political First Principles’ to influence the result of a case” (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 804 (2010))). Frassetto concludes that
“[g]uns have been regulated throughout American history, and gun laws have always evolved to meet changing public needs. The courts should not end that tradition by applying an excessively restrictive form of originalism.” Id. at 453
(footnotes omitted).
150. Id.
151. Id. (arguing that the problems with historical analysis are emphasized in
Second Amendment cases).
152. See id. at 452 (defending originalist methodology when applied
correctly).
153. Id. (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 804 (2010)
(Scalia, J., concurring)).
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analysis.154 If a law burdening conduct protected by the Second Amendment withstands means-end analysis based on the proper level of scrutiny,
it withstands a constitutional challenge regardless of whether the right can
be found in the history and text of the amendment.155 Importantly, consistent with Heller, this would not completely eliminate the role of historical analysis in Second Amendment cases.156 In cases where the
challenged law fails means-end analysis based on an appropriate level of
scrutiny, it would be necessary to fully analyze the history and text of the
Second Amendment to determine if the law burdens a right protected by
the Amendment.157
Historical analysis cannot, and should not, be eliminated entirely.
Rather, making historical analysis the second step of the two-step framework, and making means-end analysis the first, discourages “covert judicial
policymaking,” in all cases but those involving the most heavy-handed firearm regulations.158 To determine the appropriate level of scrutiny for the
means-end analysis, courts need only determine if the challenged law burdens the “core” right of the Second Amendment.159 This determination
does not require historical analysis as the Supreme Court already defined
the “core” of the Second Amendment in Heller.160
154. See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013) (explaining
the court would “hew to a judicious course” by assuming the Second Amendment
created a right to carry firearms for self-dense outside the home and proceeding to
apply intermediate scrutiny), abrogated by N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v.
Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022); see also Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d
81, 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2012) (assuming proper cause law burdens the Second Amendment and applying intermediate scrutiny), abrogated by Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111;
Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430–31 (3d Cir. 2013) (same), abrogated by Bruen, 142
S. Ct. 2111; Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 670, 672 (1st Cir. 2018) (same), abrogated by Bruen, 142. S. Ct. 2111.
155. See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876 (explaining that the court is free to assume a
law burdens the Second Amendment if it “passes constitutional muster under . . .
the applicable standard” of scrutiny).
156. Cf. id. (implying that the court would not be free to assume the challenged law burdened a Second Amendment right if it failed under the applicable
standard of scrutiny).
157. Cf. id. (implying historical analysis is required where laws fail means-end
analysis).
158. Cf. id. (explaining that historical analysis is required only if challenged
law fails means-end analysis); cf. Lund, supra note 126, at 196 (determining
whether certain conduct is protected by the Second Amendment is unnecessary if
the law regulating that conduct passes means-end analysis, thus avoiding “covert
judicial policymaking”).
159. See, e.g., Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876 (explaining that laws burdening the
core of the Second Amendment are subject to strict scrutiny but that laws otherwise burdening a Second Amendment right are subject to intermediate scrutiny).
160. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) (holding that
the “core protection” of the Second Amendment is the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to possess firearms for self-defense of the home); Woollard, 712
F.3d at 876 (noting the difference between core and non-core Second Amendment rights); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2012)
(same), abrogated by N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111
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The Ninth Circuit could have reached the same result in Young using
means-end analysis because proper cause requirements for public carry
permits can withstand any level of means-end scrutiny.161 Every circuit
court that applied means-end analysis to proper cause laws decided the
laws withstood intermediate scrutiny.162 Though no court has applied
strict scrutiny to proper cause laws, there is a strong argument that they
would withstand the compelling interest and narrowly tailored requirements.163 Based on the foregoing, the Ninth Circuit should have assumed
Hawaii’s proper cause law restricted a Second Amendment right and upheld the law by finding it withstood either intermediate or even strict
scrutiny.
VI. FAR FROM

A

MOOT POINT

The Supreme Court recently decided proper cause laws, like the law
at issue in Young, violate the Second Amendment in New York State Rifle &
Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen.164 In Bruen, plaintiffs brought a test case to challenge New York’s proper cause law.165 The Supreme Court’s decision rehashed the historical analysis conducted by the Ninth Circuit in Young and
will likely disrupt the “Second Amendment Federalism” developed in the
(2022); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2013) (same), abrogated by Bruen,
142 S. Ct. 2111; Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 670–71 (1st Cir. 2018) (same),
abrogated by Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111. But see Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d
650, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (deciding that the core of the Second Amendment extends beyond the right to possess firearms for self-defense of the home and that,
under Heller, laws burdening the core of the Second Amendment are per se
unconstitutional).
161. Tisoky, supra note 11, at 588 (arguing special need laws are narrowly
tailored to further a compelling government interest, the requirement under strict
scrutiny).
162. See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 880; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 98; Drake, 724 F.3d at
440; Gould, 907 F.3d at 676.
163. Tisoky, supra note 11, at 586–88 (“The governmental interest of protecting public safety and preventing crime . . . is indisputably compelling. . . . [Proper
cause laws] appear narrowly tailored, as those who can satisfy the [proper cause]
requirement are those most likely to exercise the right to self-defense.”).
164. 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2156 (2022) (holding New York’s proper cause law violates the Second Amendment—incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment—because the Second Amendment protects the right of law-abiding citizens
to bear arms for ordinary self-defense). Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated
the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration under
Bruen. Young v. Hawaii, 142 S. Ct. 2895 (2022).
165. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Beach, 354 F. Supp. 3d 143, 145
(N.D.N.Y. 2018) (explaining that licensing officers denied plaintiffs’ applications
pursuant to New York’s proper cause law and upholding the law under Second
Circuit precedent). The plaintiffs in Beach acknowledged that Kachalsky controlled
their case. Id. at 148–49. Recall that in Kachalsky, the Second Circuit upheld New
York’s proper cause law against a Second Amendment challenge. See supra notes
38–45 and accompanying text. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the trial
court’s decision in a summary order. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Beach,
818 F. App’x 99, 100 (2d Cir. 2020) (“Appellants’ argument that Kachalsky was
wrongly decided fails under this [c]ourt’s precedents.”).
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decade following the Heller decision.166 Although the term “Second
Amendment Federalism” seems like an oxymoron—it is federal constitutional law, supreme and immune from regional variation—the Supreme
Court’s decision in Heller grounded the individual Second Amendment
right to bear arms in self-defense, and states define the scope of self-defense.167 Further, before Bruen, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
every case involving Second Amendment challenges to proper cause laws
following Heller and McDonald.168 It is perhaps no coincidence that Bruen
was the first time the Court had an opportunity to consider the constitutionality of proper cause laws with a 6–3 balance of Republican vs. Democrat appointees.169 In striking down New York’s proper cause law, the
Court also struck down the two-step framework for Second Amendment
challenges.170 Under Bruen, the government has the burden to prove a
challenged firearm regulation is consistent with the history and tradition
of the Second Amendment; there is no place for means-end scrutiny.171
Though Bruen overrules Young and does away with the two-step framework, this Note’s critical analysis of the Young court’s history-and-tradition
approach applies the same to the Bruen decision. If anything, Bruen further highlights how the history and tradition of the Second Amendment,
as long and winding as it is, can be cherry-picked to support whatever outcome the judge-historian desires.172
166. See Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2135–36, 2149 (categorizing historical sources
“because, when it comes to interpreting the Constitution, not all history is created
equal,” and stating that the Ninth Circuit’s holding “has little support in the historical record”); Brian Erickson, Second Amendment Federalism, 73 STAN. L. REV. 727,
727 (2021) (explaining that over time federal courts have allowed state legislatures
to define self-defense firearm rights and arguing that courts should “recognize selfdefense law as a site of iterative policy development, and treat laws regulating the
instrumentalities of self-defense (for example, firearms) with a degree of deference” in what the author terms “Second Amendment Federalism”).
167. See Erickson, supra note 166, at 758 (explaining that Second Amendment
Federalism is based on how courts and legislatures define the scope of the right to
self-defense); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding
that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess firearms in the
home for self-defense).
168. Gould v. Lipson, 141 S. Ct. 108 (2020) (denying certiorari); Drake v.
Jerejian, 572 U.S. 1100 (2014) (denying certiorari); Kachalsky v. Cacace, 569 U.S.
918 (2013) (denying certiorari); Woollard v. Gallagher, 571 U.S. 952 (2013) (denying certiorari); Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (denying rehearing en banc; no petition for certiorari filed); Moore v. Madigan, 708
F.3d 901 (7th Cir. 2013) (denying rehearing en banc; no petition for certiorari
filed).
169. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx [https://perma.cc/
Z8HP-BM8Q] (last visited Oct. 17, 2022) (providing a list of present members of
the U.S. Supreme Court).
170. See Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2127 (“Despite the popularity of this two-step
approach, it is one step too many.”).
171. See id.
172. See Saul Cornell, Cherry-Picked History and Ideology-Driven Outcomes: Bruen’s
Originalist Distortions, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 27, 2022, 5:05 PM), https://
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The Supreme Court’s decision further restricts states from enacting
gun control laws and will likely affect the health and safety of thousands of
Americans.173 Before Bruen, Second Amendment litigation could generally be divided into the pre-Heller period—where the Court virtually never
entertained challenges to states’ ability to enact gun law—and the postHeller period—where the Court upheld the right of citizens to have a gun
in the home for self-defense.174 By expanding Heller and striking down
proper cause laws, the Supreme Court moved Second Amendment jurisprudence into a new era where judges may seemingly strike down almost
any gun law.175 At bottom, using history and tradition as a veneer on policy decisions to expand and contract constitutional rights erodes the separation of powers. When it comes to the Second Amendment, these
decisions have life or death consequences.176
www.scotusblog.com/2022/06/cherry-picked-history-and-ideology-driven-outcomes-bruens-originalist-distortions/ [https://perma.cc/29W4-B58E] (arguing
that the court’s selective historical analysis in Bruen presented “a version of the past
that is little more than an ideological fantasy”).
173. See Jonathan E. Lowry, Christa Nicols & Kelly Sampson, Everything’s at
Stake: Preserving Authority to Prevent Gun Violence in the Second Amendment’s Third
Chapter, 106 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 118, 120 (2021) (presenting various studies
showing that weaker gun laws are correlated with higher homicide and firearm
homicide rates).
174. Id. at 118–19 (discussing the history of Second Amendment litigation).
175. See id. at 118–19 (predicting a “third chapter” in Second Amendment
litigation).
176. See id. 119–21 (arguing that changes in gun laws have “life and death
consequences” and that expanding Heller “would put the United States into uncharted waters, because Americans have always decided gun policy through democratic processes, not judges”).
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